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Abstract

Who Receives Medical Care?

Income, Implicit Prices and the Distribution

of Medical Services Among Pregnant Women in the United States
We examine in this paper how medical treatments are distributed·among
pregnant women in the United States in 1980, according to both their initial
health and their economic resources.

Different implicit pricing.regimes for

allocating medical services are modeled and their implications for the
distribution of services elaborated.

We found that (i) more-educated women and

women with husbands having higher incomes receive a disproportionate share of
the four major treatments studied; (ii) prenatal treatments are more likely to
be provided to less-healthy infants (mothers) within schooling and income
groups; and (iii) treatment differentials by education and income are increased
by controlling for behavior that affects the pre-treatment healthiness of the
infant ...· The ,.results . are .consistent with the existence of a market regime for..
medical care that allocates health treatments to those who demand them, whether
the demand is due .to superior knowledge of the benefits of health, greater
resources, or preferences.

Mothers of healthier infants are more likely to

postpone seeing a doctor; visit a doctor less often, and are less likely to
receive treatments while pregnant.

This compensatory allocation of medical

services, combined with the inability of.the researcher to measure directly all
contributions to. pre-.treatment health, can lead to erroneous .inferences
concerning the efficacy of the treatments.

Controlling for initial health

status is shown to significantly change measures of the therapeutic benefits of
medically-administered treatments in the US health care system.

It is now a well-e&tabliahed fact thct high-income and highly-edu~t$d
per&ons in the United State& ~re healthier than their poorer end le&a-oducated
counterparto <Taubaan and Rosen, 1982; Fucha, 1985>.

In part becauaa of concern

&bout inco&e disparities in health, public resources have been allocated to
subsidize medical care to vulnerable, poor populations in the United Stetes
(Coraan and Gt·ossaan, 1985). For exa~ple, the Medicaid program, enacted in 1965,
finances Medical service& for poor faailiea who are eligible for Aid to Faailiea
with Dependent Children.

Medicare provides siailar subsidies to the old;

6aendaents to Title V of the Social Security Act of 1963 authorize federal
grants to facilitate the provision of prenatal and obstetrical care to low. incoae populations in "aedically underserved" localities, and the Woaen. Infants
and Children CWIC> prograa, begun in 1983, provides grants to local agencies for
the provision of food supple:aents to pregnant and lactating woaen.
Coexisting with thase federal health subsidies directed to low-inco11e
9roups the federal tax code per11its ~edical expenditures to be deducted fro•
gross taxble incoas (though restrictions have tightened over the years>.

This

"tax subsidization" (Pauly, 1986> of aedical care clearly benefits Most persona
with high incomes confronting high Marginal tax rates.

The pervasiveness of

untaxed health benefit's in co•pensation packages of full-the workers is yet
another way tax policy subsidizes health care for selected groups.

It is thus

unclear what the ntlt distributional consequenceG are o:f these varied ·inter
ventions in health care pricing.
Despite conce~n about inequities in health care, little is known about the
distribution of tht1 actual use of aedical services across groups defined by
incoae, education, r~ce, or initial health, or whether inequalities in the
after-tax pricing of ~edical care aitigate or exacerbate health differentials.
Indeed, in on environ~ent in which health is c noraal consuMer good and ia
1

i_nf luenced in part by the behavior of consu111er.s <consuieption of health-related
goocl.s>, and aedical aervicea <"treat.aenta'") ore aubetitutea for auch health
related gooda, it is not obvious that those with higher-incose=;will conauae aore
treataent& even under a regiae in which the iMplicit price& of aedical
treataenta ars not affected by incoae.

It is tberefora not poaaible to infer

froa only the di&tribution of aedical services used by incoae clas& or by race
whether agent& face different iaplicit prices for auch service&.

ftoreover, a

regiae in which treat•ent& are co~pleaentary to health-related goods could not
be distinguished

fro■

a regiae in which high-incoae agents (conau•era/producera

of health> pay lower prices (net of taxes> for treataents.

Tcble 1 presents si~ple statistics on the incidence of four coaaon
treatEtents provided to pregncnt woaen ccro&s race, incoiR~..and education classes,
based on a probability saaple of all women havin~ a legitiaate live birth in
1980 in the United States.

Among these woaen of aiailar. but by no aeana

identical, pre-treataent health statue, there are soae striking differences in
treatMent incidence.

For exaMple, Black mothers were 40 percent less likely to

have received an x-ray than White aothers but were claost 20 percent aore likely

to have received a caesarean section; aaniocentesis was 50 percent lea& likely,

x-rays 26 percent less likely and ccesarean section 24 percent less likely to
have been provided to aothers whose husbands earned lee& than $6000 in 1979

coapared to aotheru whose husbands inco•e was at least 630000.

Mothers with at

least so•e college-level schooling, aoreover, were alao&t twice as likely as
aothers with lesa than nine years of schooling to have received en x-roy while
pregnant.
The inequities in aedical treataenta received by aocioeconoaic groups
indicated in Table 1 do not i•ply that the less-healthy receive fewer
treat•ents; it is possible that goods deleterious to (infent) health have
2

Toble 1
Percent of Pregnant Wolilen Receiving Selected Medical Service&, by Type of
Treataent, and by Race, Schooling of Mother end Husband's Incoae in 1980

Treataent
X-Ray

Caesarean
Section

/umiocentesi&

Ultrasound

White

4.4

41.4

16.9

17.0

IHsck

4.9

40.8

10.0

21.1

f6000 (S)

3.5

42.1

13.1

14.4

6000-15000

4.1

41.0

15.5

17.1

15000-21000

4.1

41.7

17.5

18.2

21000-30000

5.4

40.9

18.0

17.8

isoooo

7.0.

43.2

17.7

19.0

iS years

6.3

35.2

9.9

16.2

9-11 years

4.7

38.8

13.4

15.4

12 years

3.7

42,1

15.2

16.5

~13 years

4.9

42.2

19.2

18.9

Population

Husband'& Incoae

Mother's Schooling

Source:

1980 National Natality Followback Survey.

greater incoae elasticities, or health-augMenting goods have lower incoae
· elaaticitiea than does health.

For exoaple, highly-educated aothera aay

postpone birth& relative to le&a-educated aothers, which aay be potentially
horaful to infant health, requiring aore careful aonitoring and treataenta.

In

the absence of inforaation on pre-treataent health etatua it ia thus difficult
to evaluate how fornal aedical services are distributed across agents.
In this pcper6 we examine how aediccl treat•ent& a&&ociated with care
during pregnancy are distributed in the United States within and aero&• pre
treataent health groups.

The existence of a probe.bility aaaple of pregnant

wo111en (births> affords a special opportunity to study one group that is
.relatively ho~ogeneous, but not identical, in health &tatus for whoM the
.relevant aedical treetaenta are relatively a11all in nuaber end.whose relevant
health-related behavior i& also well··docu11ented.1

Moreover, 11edical care

provided to expectant mothers ia i11portant since it is care supplied
si•ultaneously to two generations.
In section 1, we show that it ia possible to distinguish health care
regill!e& characterized, by di&tributiva

QY,!.,

pricing aechani6M& (price6, sub&idie&.,

rationing> with knowl9dge of the technology of pre- and poet-treataent health
production, and by co•paring the overall distribution of treat~ents to
individuals by their sociosconouic characteristics

with the distribution within

groups defined by their pre-treataent health stat~s. In section 2, we report
estimates of how consu11ption decisions by the 11othera interact with the 111edical
procedures to affect one salient health outco•e anasure, birthweight.

In

&action 3. reduced-for• and conditional Con pre-treataent health> treataent
equations are estiaated to assess the effects of pre-treataent health status and
&ocioeconoaic characteristics of pregnant wo•en on the probability of their
receiving each of the four aedical treat~ents.
3

Our result& indicate (i) that

the efficecy of the treataents var!•• according to the condition• o~ the birth
that aro aaaocieted with pre-treet~ent choice. aad• by woaenJ <ii> thet theae
pre-treataent condi tiona vary aignificantly with inco1ue. education, ,end rece:
(iii) that treatment• are aore likely to be providGd to th• leaa-healthy birtha
<•others>, but, (iv> that disparitiea in the incidenc• of treataents by inco•••
educction end race aaong woaen with otherviae id~ntical birth characteriatica,
i.e.,

pre-treatMent health, are greater than such disparities not conditioned

on birth characteri8tics.

Thia neans that the lower incidence of

treat■enta

a111on9 poor, less-educated •others, evident in Table l understate& the inequalfty

·in treehent incidence when differences in pre-treataent heal th conditions, a1·e
· taken into account.

However• we show that this differential between

within-

health atatus group inequalities and the inequalities unconditioned on health
status does not lend support to the hypothesis the.t the iaplicit price of
aedicul care ia lower for the higher-incoae groupeo

On the other hand, we find

that Black aother& with otherwise identical, health-relevant birth charac
teriatica, inco•e• ffnd education are significantly leas likely to receive two of
the four treataent& in Tt!ble 1: neither socioecono:llic status nor differences in
birth characteristics can account for these racial disparities.
1.

The De~and for Health and tbs De»and for Medical Care
To depict usefully the interrelationships betueen the behavior of agent.

who are heterogeneous in health, their use of medical service&, and the health

a.-

care "delivery &yat:7

it ia iaportant to distinguish two types of health

input&--prascribed ~edical inputs provided by aedical practitioner&
(utreataents"> and other goods consumed by agents that affect health but which
ol&oyield utility directly.
in a two-stage process.

To highlight thi&. as&ulle that health i& produced

In the first st.a9e, an agent i's pre-treataent health

hi is a function of hia own consuMption of good Xi and an exogenous endowment

l-1, auch that
(1)

We

will

a&&Wle

that X

ia a

healthy good, auch that hJ > 0 <and h,:, < .O) for J •

1,2, although the analyaia could be •Y••etrically couched in teraa of X being
bad for be~lth <but contributing directly to utility>.

In the •econd atage. finol heGlth Hi i& influ•n~ed by aedicGl treataent.a
received ti aa wall as pre-trsataent health status.
2 i . i
1 i i
i
H = H{t ,h) = H(t ,X ,µ)

(2)

. where HJ > o,. J

a

1,2.

Wa will assune that the t:reataenta are ;uieliorative,

&ub&titut.es for. the X-good,

$0

that

:a12 < o.

but it i& only i11portant that ths

efficacy of the treatiaent depend on pre-treataent health or X.
Agent i aaxiaize& hi& utility, given.by
(3)

where UJ > 0, J., l,2f3, and Z is a non-health good, &ubJect to a budget.
constraint:
(4)

ri

where

i& 09ant i'& incoae. pz and Px are price& of X and

z.

respectively,

G&&uaed to be the &aDe aero&& all agent&, Pt<Fi) ia the price per treataent,
which aay be a function of incoae, and c is a f!~ad (capitation) fee. di&cu&&ed

below.
Wa J\ay di&tingu!sh three aedical care regilles u&ing (4).

In the firat,

"noraal ~arket" regiae CI>. traatMents are suppli-d as in an ordinary aarket uo
that

Pt' : 0 and c., O: all agent& pay for each trectPent they receive <"fee-

s

for-eervice•> and fcce the aaae treat~ent price.

In e aubuidized fee-for

aervico regiMe (II>, iaplicit treatment prices vary with inco•••

For oxaaple,

with a progressive incoae tax end health care deductibility, Pt' < O.

Both

regiaea I and II are characterized by conauaer sovoreignty--private agents
conauae treataenta baaed on their knowledge of tr•ataent efficacy, froa (2), and
their preferences aubJect to <4>.

The aedical provider'• (doctor's) roles a.re

to C>upply inforMation on treataent efficacy and to supply (apply> the trsataent
if it ia wanted by the agent.2
A third regime <III> <co•pulsory health insu~ance) ccn b~ characterized~•

Pt• 0 "1hile c > O; aedical treataanta are ..free .. ; agents pay o ~ixed fee
independent of the treataenta they receive.

In thia lest regiae, it ia

nece&&ary to &pecify the allocation.rule for tre~taenta, given th• 6b5ence of a
For exaaple, the allocation rulo aay be

direct price and cona:u11er sovereignty.

dete~•ined froa the ~axi~ization of health value-added across agents, i.e.,
(5)

~

&ub3ect to a global ~esource constraint T
per treatment.

Etp , whera p ia the re&ourc. coat

However the rule& 6ro established, the doctor priaarily aake&

the decision concerning the distribution of treateenta.
It i& possible to consider a fourth regiRA in which agent& can pay
different fixed fee& ci for different health plan& that entitle tbea to a fix~d
schedule of treat•enta depending on pre-treataent health.

In that regi•••

overage levels of treat•enta would differ across agenta paying different
capitation fee& but not within fee groups.

The~ is, within fee-group&, doctor&

However. this re9i11e ia ahlilar to and

deter:llline the allocation of treatMenta.

indistinguishable fro~ the first two regiMe& in ter•s of its iaplications for
the relationship between incoae end treatsentsa since agents still choose the
6

l

(average> level of treataenta they want by selecting a different plan, at a
different cost--all agent.a aay face the aaae fee schedule or agent.a aay face
different iaplicit fee &chedulea if there ere incoae-roloted auba!di•••

We un the aodel to consider three queationa.

Firat, what ia the

relationship between pre-treataent health and treatae?t• under th• thrse
regiae&, i.e., ia the allocation of treatmont& by health atatua aaong people

vith identical incoaes different acroae regiaea?

Second, what ia the

r•lationship between incoae and health treatments under each regiae, and-third,
how doe& the regise affect the distribution of trGat•onts by inco•e aao09 people
of the sa11e pre-treat111ent health &tatu& co1tpared to the distribution by in,coae
acrosa all people.

More for11ally, the question& can be poaed in teras of the

regi~e-spscific prc,pertiea of the reduced-fora and conditional. (on X> demand
equations fo:r treataenta.

These are derived fro• the aodel and are given by (6)

and <7>,

(6)

t i* =

(7)

i p , pt, Fi)
t*(Xi ,µ,
2

The conditional denand equation <7> describes the outcoae of an experiaent
•in which each egent. is assigned a fixed level of X but can freely choo&e the

non-health good z and obtains treataents according to the prevailing health c~re
regiae.

If

xi

is fixed at the level the agent would otherwi&e have cho&en in

the absence of quar.tity constraint&, we can eaploy the theory of rationing
<Houthakker and Tobin, 1950> to ascertain tba effects on the levd of treataeri"t.s
received of a change in pre-treataent health status. or

xi

variations in incoaa for given pre-treat11ent health status.

7

and

µ, and of

Coneider firat how treataente vary with "exo9enoua• varietione in pr•
troctaent. input.a and t.he endowaent within on inco•• group.

In the at.andord

aerket regiae <I> or in e regiao with fee aubeidi•• but agent aovereignty <II>,
thio 1• aiaply
(8)

where the •iJ ere the Hicks coapenaated substitution effects for good i with
respect to the price of 900d J•

When treatments and the health-related good X

ere aubatitutes in production and conauaption, •xt > 0 end the leaa-heclthy
c110n9 cgents vith identical inco11es receive aore treataents.

Of co~r&o, if X

o.nd health ere Gu:fficiently strong co11pleaenta in the welfare function (exercise
end health?>, it is possible that those agents consuaing high levels of X will
also derAand nore trsat11enta, even if X and tare &ubatitutea in health
productionJ the a&&ociation between pre-treataent health end the level of
treataenta depends both on the health technology and on preferences.
Under a rationing regiae <III>. such a& one in which treataents are
allocated across agent& ·to aaxiaize health value-added. as in <5>, however, the
relationship between pre-treat.Jent health (or health inputs> and treataenta
depends solely on the·propertiea of the health technology:
(9)

~references for health play no role as they do under en agent-aovoreignty
re9i ■ e.

Knowledge of the health technology i& then sufficient to ascertain how

the rationing_or co~pulaory health insurance regiae would allocate aedicol
treatMenta across p3ople

of

different health gtatu& coapared to any existing

health care syate•.

8

It ia, of courae, i•po••ible to prodiot how the inooae-trN taent
aa&ociation will differ ocroa& the tbr•• health deli•ery regi••• without

iapoain9 a great deal aore atructure on th• Model.

It ia thua not posaible to

infer the regiae fro• the distributio n of treataenta by inco•••

Bowsver,

coaparieona of reduced-for a and conditional (on pre-treatae nt health) incoae
effect• on treetaent& can under certain conditions identify how income end
health care. prices interact, with few additional a&&uaption&.

In the rationing

re9iae, for @Y.ample, there is no relation&hi p between income and treat&ent&
aaon9 agents with the same pro-treatae nt health status; treatfflent& vary aero&&
income groups under that regime solely due to difierences in the consu•ption of
X <which varies by incollle) or in endow•ents (which do not vary with incoJRe, by
-aaauaption> . -The absence of any incoae effect conditional on pre-treatae nt
health status thus identifies a syste• in which forMal health services are
allocated on the basis of "need.. alone, defined strictly in health terJRs.
When treatments are allocated in

6

nQrJllnl market, (no agent-spec ific

prices>, the conditional incoJlle effect on treatae~ts i& not zero, but is
(10)

dti*I
dFi

where dtil/dFi is tho reduced-for • income effect fro• CG> and dtiwl/dFi is the
conditional inco~e effect from <7> under regi~e I.

The conditional incoRe

effect will be positive, if Xis a nor•al good an1 Xi and heclth tre~t~ents are
aubstitutes .

Moreover, it is readily seen fro• (10> that treat~ents will vary

aore strongly (and positively) with incoae among agents with the sa•e pre
treataent health status than across all agents.

This is ~erely the well-know~

result froa rationing theory, en application of ·LaChatelie r's p1·inciple, that
condition~l incoMe effects exceed reduced-forJ ll incoae effects for goods that are
substitutes for the ..rationed" good.

Thus, if treatffients are.allocat ed in a

9

r

regular aarket. •controlling for" differentials in pre-treataent health
increases diaporitiea in treataent by inco•• rather than reduces the•.
Wh~n treataent prices vary with incoae. the gifference between the health
conditioned income effect and the unconditional or reducod-for~ inco•e effect is
given by
s
i
dt iII=
xt [dX
,
- dF 1
- 8 xx dpt pt

<11>

+

d. XiII
]
dFi

Here. bacauae inco~e and price effects move together. when health-related
consuMption goods and treatMents are substitutes ~nd Pt' < 0 (higher-income
agents are subsidized), the conditional inco•e effect on treataents May be leso
than the unconditional effect--incoae-relcted disparities in treatments ~ay be
emaller within groups of similar pre-treataent at~tus than across the whole
population.

If low-2ncoae agent& tend to receive the highest aedical care

subaidiea, however, t.he relationship between income and treat•ents within health
lroup& will be stronger than the association between incoae and treatments for
the overall population, as in the noraal aarket c~se.

The intuition for the

foraer result. which provides a (weak> test for the existence of a regressive

health pricing regi~E.t~· is that expression <11) coiabines two well-known results
fro• rationing theoz·y - that conditional exceed unconditional inco1te effect.s and

~onditional own (coMponsated) price effects ara w~aker than their unconditional
counterparts for <nor~al> goods that are substitutes for the fixed good.

If a

ri&e in inco1te also lowers the treat11ent price. tt.e weakening of the price
effect offsets the usual strengthening of the inc~•e effect.

Another reason why iltplicit treat11ent price-& 1u1y vary with inco111e is given
in the household production literature <Becker, 1965; Acton, 1975>.

If the

value of tbe is hi9h9r for high-incoae agents and use of Medical care is a
tiae-intensive activity, then the shifts in substitution and inco~e effects

10

ecroa a oondi tiona l end uncon dition al trect aent equat ion• reinf
orce ecch other .
Only if the iBpli cit aubsi dy to hi9h-i nc011 e agent a i& suffi
cient ly high vill
uncon dition al exce&d cond itiona l incoa e effec ts on treat
aenta .
Eatia ction of the healt h techn ology and of both reduc ed-fo
r• end
cond itiona l Con health > treat aent equati on& thus provid e&
c aecns Ci) of
eacer tcinin g how aedic cl treat aenta ere alloc ated accor ding
to healt h &t3tu a in
a given he~lt h-reg iae, (ii) of coapc ring the exist ing
healt h-rel ated trect aent
alloc ation s to those that would exist under c "need a-bc&
ad" syste1 1, end <iii) o!
descr ibing the acnne r in which medic al c~re coeta end incoa
e inter act on
balan ce~ in addit ion to provi ding Measu res of incoa e dispa
rities in the
alloc ation of Medical treatR ent& withi n group s co~pa rable
in pre-t reata ent
healt h statu s.
2.

·Pren atal Care end Birth weigh t

e.

The Data and Sppc ificat ion of the Technology
The prece ding discu ssion sugge sted th~t to a5ses s how the
preva iling

aedic al care regia e influe nce& the distri butio n of aedic
el servi ces acros s
hetero geneo us agent s requi res inforM ation not only on agent
s' socio econo ~ic
,qhar acter istic& ~nd l'.~dic al treat aents recei ved, but also
on agen ts' prebeat• ent healt h statu o ·and on behav ior relev ant to healt
h.

Such «n analy sis of

the distri butio n of aadic al treat aents caong adult s would be
heroi c indee d.
There is en anorMous rango of behav ior

that

M6Y

poten tially relat e to healt h

and aany healt h indic ators . Moreo ver, infor ~atio n on the
entir e life-h istor y of
each agent would presum ably be requi red. The analy sis of
prena tal infan t care,
howev er, is aore feasi ble since the life-h istor y cf the
relev ant agent is
neces sarily short , speci fic indic ators of healt h appea r
to be More salie nt than
other &, and the nuabe , of beh~v iors and treata snt& poten
tially relev ant to birth
outco •es ia relat ively s~all .

11

The 1980 lfotiond Natclity Yollowback Survey <NNF5> i& well-&uited to an

analysis of the diatribution of traat••nta acroaa infant& and pregnant voaen.

· It provide• birth outcoae inforaation on a probability aa•pla of all li•• birth&
in the United 5tutea in 1980 coabined with

infor ■ ation

on the aocioeconoaic

characteristics of the child's parents, on the aother'a behavior while pregnant
that i& deemed relevant by the aedical profession to birth outcoaes, and on all
aedical treataente received by the aother during her pregnancy and at the birth

of the infant bused on birth certificate infornation and on questionnaire& sent
to both tho mother and her doctor<s>.

Fro• these data, a working sa~ple of 7669

legiti•ate births with the requisite inforaation waa obtained.

The 1980 NNFS

was drawn by over-saapling (4 to 1> fro11. the strata of births under 2500 grams,
with the obJective of better understftnding the deter•ninants of low birthweight.
If we neglected the waighting of the saaple by the dependent variable, our
analysis would yield ~ia~ed and inconsistent esti~ates.

We have, thus, repeated

observations on births over 2500 graaa four tiaes, to create a self-weighting
eaaple, end reduced the nuaber of degrees of freedo• in statistical tests to the

original sample size.
Froa informcti?n·provided on the county or county-group of aother'&
residence in the 1980 NNFS, variables were appended to the individual data to
characterize the cour.ty or county-group of residence to serve cs identifying
instruaent& in the e~pirical analyses, described ~)elow.

These variables include

the characteristic& of local medical and faaily planning infrastructure, aedical

personnel, public expenditures, coaposition of e•~loyaent and uneaployaent, an~
local price& of cigarette& and alcohol. and are dnscribed in Appendix Tcble A.
We eaploy a& our indicator of early child health the weight of the child ct
birth. a salient preoictor of both infant 11ortality and subsequent health and
intellectual achievement (National Academy of Sciences, 1985).
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We first esti-

aate the birthweight product.ion function. oorre&pondin9 to <2>. in order to
. enawer t,hree queationa.

firat, doaa porental behavior. net of aedical treat

••nta\ influence "the birth outcoae (child heGlth)?
treatnenta affect birthwei9ht?

Second, do prenatal aedical

Third. ia the efficGcy of aedical treataenta

r•lated to the characteristic of the birth; naMely, do the effects of aedical
treataenta interoct with the pre-treat~ent behavioral 'input& choaen by ~rents?
We have in part already an&wered th~ fir&t question in our prior analyses of
birthwei9ht <Rosenzweig and Schultz. 1982 and 1983> baaed on data for 1967-69
froa a predecessor aurvey to the 1$80 NNFS.

In those analyses we found that

such pre-treatnent behavior aa the tiain9 end nuaber of birth&, smoking by the

.

aother, and the rapidity with which prenatal care was first sought by the Mother
after conception signi£icantly effected birthweight and fetal growth.

However,

we did not exaaine the effect& of these inputs net of subsequent prenatal
aedical treatment& nor the interactions between tr~atments and the parentally

chosen inputs, due to the lack of information on aedical services in those.
earlier data.

In the present analysis we examine the influence on birthweight of the .pre
treatrAent ·Variables aentioned and three co••on lletlical procedures applied ,Prior
to delivery to identify and aonitor potential proplea& of the pregnancy-
caniocentesis, ultrasound and fetal x-rays.

In addition we evaluate how the

(prior> interval between births and the nu~ber of visits aade by the aother
during her pre9nancy affects birthweight.

The interval between the current

birth and the previous birth is co~aonly attributed a role in deter•ining the
•other'& health and the child'& birthweight, at least for short intervals
(National Acadeay of Sciences, 1985).

The nuMber of prenatal visits in addition

to the delay in firct seeking prenatal IAedical care provides another indicator
of the •other's actual use of Medical care.
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The A~erican College of

Obstetricicns -tmd Gynecologist• <1982) recoaaend& a aother plan on about 13
prenatal care •viait&J" the average nuaber in the 1980 NNFS waa 10.9.

The

ti11ing of initial prenatal care and nuaber of viaita ere, of courae, invoraely
correlated.

Conaequently the aeasured effect of each ia aen&itive to whether

the other variable ia excluded.
Of the four treat~ent& adainiatered to pregnant woaen considered here-
aaniocente&ia, ultrasound, x-ray, and caesarean &ection--the first three are
used to confira fetal develop•ent and position during pregnancy. whereas the
caesarean section procedure pGrtain& to the actual delivery of the infant.

The

first three procedure& applied during the pregnancy thus ffiay directly affect the
~evelopaent of the fetu& and are included aaong the determinants of birthweight.

As discussed, neither the pre-treatMent health behavior of parents nor the
treatments are likely to be randosly allocated.

Tt,e existence of un•ea&ured,

exog,enous characteristic& of births possibly known to the parents and/or doctors
aake& it likely that oll of the potential health-related decision variables wiU
be correlcted with the error terJi in the production function equation, as we

found in o.ur earlier study.
are used selectively.

It is even aore likely that the Medical procadure&

If, for exa•ple, the treatment& are predominantly used

<avoided) in ca6es where the pregnancy is likely to result in a low birthweight
baby, the treataentu Might appear to exhibit an inverse (direct) partial
correlation with birthweight to the extent that ths included v~riables do not
coMprehensively ~easure the initial health of the fetus or aother.

But when

this correlation ia•estillated by Methods that are free of bias due to treat11ent
&election, a positive <negative> birthweight effect Might be inferred for an
average aother.
To obtain consistent estiMatea of the effects of both the treat•ents and
the pre-treataent purental behavior, we eMploy two-stage least squares.
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The

aodel au99o&t& that price& <or their proxies) of the inputs a& well a& the
pricaa of all con&unption good&, whether or not such good& influence health,
aerve a• natural inatru-.enta for esti~ation of the paraaeter& of tho production

technology, aa long a& such price& are uncorrelated with the unmeasured health
endowaent.

Accordingly, we use our coaaunity-level variable&, listed in the

appendix, oa well aa parents' achooling attainaent and husband'• incoae a&
identifying in&truaents.

That is, the deMand equation& <G> are the first-&tage

eq.iation&.3
Econoaic theory does not provide any insights into the functional fora of
the biological production function describing the relationships betw~en parental
behavior. aedical treatnents and health.

In the 1967-69 NNS we analyzed general

second-order approxiaations of the linear and log-linear production functions
<i.e.~ Leontief-Diewert and Tronslog specifications> to ·allow for these and
other nonlinearities and interactions in the birthweight production function.
Our statistical teHts of the aigni:ficance of the, 1r.any additional paralletera
required to fit th~se aecond-order approxiaations were reJected when appropriate
esti•ation procedures w~re eaployed; nonlinearities may nonetheless be i~portant
in certain cases, but they proved difficult to estiaate because of collinearity
of inputs and the data require•ents of the two-stage estiaation technique.

In

our analysis of the 1980 NNFS we have retai_ned the quadratic ter• for •other's
age and test for interactions between the 11edicto.l treat•ents and the endogeneous
birth characteristi.cs.

A quadr(ltic in births

01°

parity was never statistically

significant in the two-stage estimates. and only specifications oaitting those
variables are repor.ted.

Moreover, the birthweight effect of birth order i&

apparently due to lower weight for the first child; on indicator of whether or
not the birth is the first i& thus included in all specifications, but nu~ber of
births is excluded.

The first birth du•~Y vari~ble i& also needed to esti~ate
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the effect of the prior birth interval, which i& of cour&e undefined for first

In addition to the endogeneou& treataent variable.sand pre-treat•ent birth
charact~ristic s, we also include in the specification of the birthweight
technology four characteristic& of the birth and the aother not subJect to
choice but likely to be related to birthweight--th e height and race of the
11other, the &ex of the infant and whether or not the birth is part of a multiple
birth (plural>.

Inclusion of the race of the Qother <Black or not-Black>

enables a test of the hypothesis that racial differences in birthweight can be
explained solely in ter11ts of differences in parent behavior and/or a different
incidence of formal, prenatal Medical treataents.
E&timation of the birthweight technology using consistent aethods also
pernit& ~easurement of the individual birthweight endowaent for the Mothers in
the .&a11ple.

To comp)Jte the birth endow111ents, the consistent two-stage

estiaatea of the birthwei9ht production function are

co ■ binad

with tne actual

birth _characteristic s and treatments for each woaan to predict her child's
birthweight
(12)

B ~i
1

<a:

B + B X. + B t .
1

, 0

1

2

1

where the B denote the line~rized para•eter estimatea of the second fora of
equation <2>.

The difference between realized birthweight and predicted

birthweight, fro• (12>, is defined as the birthweisht endow•ent u., although it
1

also includes an error associated with ffleasureMent,i. e.,

(13)

u

i = Bi - B~1 =
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Thi& JRea&ure of the health endow111.ent of the child i& included in the reduced
fora equation& for the various for•a of health behavior and the treataent&

discussed in section c, below, to assess how both the parents' behavior and the
allocation of treataents respond to the endowed healthiness of the child.
b.

Esti~ate~ of the Birthwei9ht Effects of Parent Behavior and Treat111.ents
'

Table 2 reports the OLS and two-stage least &quare& <TSLS) estiaates for
three specific~tions of the birthweight production function:
the specific Medical treataents (cols. 1 and 2>.

the first excludes

The second specification

includes in linear for~ the three prenatal Medical treatments (cols. 3 and 4>.
The third specification peraits treataent effects to vary by the •other's age,
the parity of the birth, and whether· the pregnancy results in a aultipl~ birth
Ceola. 5 and G>.
EstiJlation procedure does subst.antially .al tE",r. inferences concerning t.he
effects of both the aedical treatments and parent behavior net of treatMents.
for exa~ple, a~ong the birthweight inputs deterJ11ined by the parents, the OLS
, results indicate that_the length of the previous birth interv.al is inversely
cissociated with birthw.ei9ht, whereas the TSLS esth,ates indic.ate the opposite.
It May be inferred that mothers who are more likely to have (to have had> larra
healthy babies ior reasons that are uncorrelated with our instruments also tend
to space their births closer together, generating the observed inverse partia!
association COLS estifflates>.

The coiisistently-e.et.iJ11atedCTSL5) biological effect

of an added year's spacing, on the other hand, .it a gain of nearly SO graas.

To

evaluate the effect of being a first born, it is• necessary to subtract froM the
coefficient on "first-born" the previous birth interval coefficient ~ultiplied
by the average interval for later births (46.3).

The two-stage least squares

estimates iRply first born babies are about 300 9raMs lighter, on average, while
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Tacle 2.
Estimates of the

B1rtn~eig ►.t

Procuct1on Function Ir;:luc1ng l'lei:1ca! Treatments

Inputs
Estiaation Procedure

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6}

CLS

TS...S

CLS

TS..S

OLS

T~S

Con=~tior;s a: birtn

Age of rothera

14.e

(2,37)0

Age squar~
first

-.225
(2. 07)

BorrF

-113

Previous c1rtn interva1 2
Be1avior of ~~tier ~~ile or~Qr,ant
Delay before saw doctora

Pre~~tal care v1sitsa
Ciearettes 5/i!oket per ca1.a

(12.4)
-.428
(2.96)

14.8

(6.92)
27.0
t26. e;
-11.0
(25. 5)

10. 7 127
12.2
178
(2.35) (1.81) (2. 45i (2.02)
(2.34)
-2.27
-.158 -2..46
-.183 -2.65
(2. 41 > (1.44) (2.52) (1.63) (1. 8. >
-186
-114
-199
-113
119
(2.19) (le.SJ
(2.17i (10. l)
(0.71)
-.427
2.55
3,79
-.44l
2.11
(l.77)
(2.97) (1.39) <:s.e:::i (1. 76}
118

-8.43
(0.45)

14. 6

(6.84)
2f..S
a>.~
(3.63) (2&. 71
-13. 7 -11.1
(4. 01 > (25.5i

-14.8
(~. 75)
23.7
(2. 91)

-13.8
(3.73)

14.8

-9.25

(6.91}

(0,33)

26.B
(25.6)
-11.0

(25.5)

33.3
(2. 78)
-il.5
(2.25)

l':e~ica; trea:re~ts currnc ::reor,an£!:

Arnr:io::entesisa

-BB.2
(5. 44)

tJltrase:unca

31i
(l, 4~}

-137
{1,5B)

-43.7
51.5
(1,2i) (0. 75) (1.09)
· 14. 7 -i5f ·
193
.(1.63)
-{1,4E,l
(3.50)
8.17

I-Raya

Amniocentesis·x age of mtneril
A:imiccer.te;;is x pl:ira~ birtna
frr.r,iccentesis x .:lirt~, o:·t-e~
X

a;ee

Ultrasound x plura: birtn°
Ul traSOUT..J x bl rt:i orcer.a
X-Ray x a;ea

<0.22)
779

(1.24)
5.~
(5.46)

21.e
(0.47i
188
4938
(l.85)
(2.12)
-72.7
61.5
2.27
(0. 79i

(1,96)

Uitrasc~~d

-376

1.63

10.05)

-24.3

(i.12)
<1.e-s,
123
-13.S
(0,,15i
,2.4e.i
1&.3 -19'3
(1.27}
(0.61)

-6.29 -1S4
(3.2~)

(5. 65)
i335
(2.20) (1.22)

X-Ray x plural birtn°
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X-Ray .x nir:n orce:-B

-41.4 -1155
(2.17}
(3.ei;

Exo~enous characteristics of ei~ilc and 1110ther
Black
-'i5!
-228
Fe11ale ir,far.~

(18.9)
-149

(22. 8)

Plt.-ral birth

Heig~t of sotier
Iriterce:it

-945

F

-149
(21. 7)

-974

(3&.5)

(36.3i

32.6
(26.3i
915

32.9
(25.2).
-297

(8.40)

fF

<1&. l >

.150
412

-227
!18.8)

-150
(22.9)

-549
(38.5)
32.5

(26,2)
989
(0,46)
(8, TT>

-266
(15.4)
-146
(20.1)

~

(18.6)

-150

327

a. Enoo2er.ous variable.
b. Asymptotic ·t-ratios in paJ"entheses beneath coeff1c1ents

(10. 2)

-144

(14. 8)
(11.8)
-1075
-961
-1628
(2.39)
(28.7) (25. 7)
33.4
35.7
32.S
(26,2}
(23. 9)
(19.0)
-2as1
-384
969
(0.53)

8.45)

.151

263

-259

.152

200

20!

(1,90}

n.e

the OLS estiaate& indicate that first-born children, ceterit paribus, weigh only
93 graM& less than any younger aibling& at birth.
Adverse &9lection by aothers is evident in the estiaate& of the conse
quence& of delay by the aother& in &eein9 a doctor while pre9nant.

The nu~ber

of aonths that elapse into the pregnancy prior to a doctor visit is positively
and significantly associated with birthweight according to the (biased) OLS
esti~ates, but is negatively and insignificantly related to birthwei9ht in the
two-stage estiMates.

This strong selection bias was also found in our prior

work on the earlier saMple.

The nuMber of prenatal care visit& the woaan had at

the tiMe of her delivery, however, is positively associated with her having a
larger baby whichever estiMation procedure is used--the two-stage estiaate& in
coluan 2 suggest that added prenatal visits exert a saall but not insignificant
• benefit to the child's birthweight of 26 graas per visit.

The 9ross

quantitative effect of prenatal visits, aoreover, i& not reduced when the
various aedical treatments that Might occur during such visits are explicitly
entered into the second specification of the birthweight production function.
The estiaates indicate that a Mother who had, say, five visits rather than the
safflple average of ll w9uld incur a deficit in her child's birthweight of about
140 grams or 4.2 perGent, on average (i.e., 24 x 5.9 = 142).
The t~o-stage loast squares estimates also a~~i9n substanti~l i~portance to
the mother's age in influencing the baby's birthwcight: fertility ti•ing is
iaportant.

The optimal Maternal age _at birth is 26 in all specification&.

The ~agnitude of the estimated TSLS age gradient is substantial: a Mother at a9e
18 or 34 could expect according to the esti•ate~ in col. (4) of Table 2 to have
a child who would be 160 grams smaller than a mother who has her child at the

preferred age of 26.

The estifflates of the effects of the other pre-treataent

variables on birthweight conform to our prior findings, including the iMp~rtance
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of Maternal &aoking and the existence of a significant Black-White bi~thwei9ht
differential <in favor of White&) net of both parental input& and aedical
procedures <Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983)). In

&UM,

the parent&' pre-treataent

behavior, net of treataents, aignificantly influence& the birth outco•••
The estiMate& of the effects of the three prenatal treataent& in
specification 2 also show the i•portance of adJu&ting for the non-rondo•
allocation of Medical care for inferring the health effects of such care.

For

exaMple, the OLS esti~ate of the birthweight effect pf a~niocentesis i&
&ignificant and negative (-88 graas), whereas the estiaates that correct for
treat•ent selection suggest& that this procedure increases the baby'& birth
weight by 310 graa&, although the estiaate is not very precise.

X-r5ys, on the

other hand, appear t.o be related to a 16 gro.11 weight gain in the OLS regressior;,
but according to the two-stage estiMates this procedure contributes to a weight
los& of 156 gra•s.

However, the two-stage esti•ate is again'statistically

significant at only the 15 percent confidence level.

Neither the direct nor the

instruDental variable e&ti•ate& of the effects of ·ultrasound procedures detect

any ef!~ct on birthweight.
In the third specification. the estiaate& indicate that the birthweight
effects of both amniocentesis and fetcl x-rays vary significantly with the
characteristics of the fetus and P-other& with. however. ultrasound again being
insignificantly rel~ted to birthwaight.

In particular, amniocentesis enhances

the weight of babie~ at birth when the births are plural, and fetal x-rays
appear to reduce bir·thweight ~ost for older Mothero and for higher-parity
births. but are beneficial when the births are plural.

That is, among young

mothers having their first birth and carrying •ore.than one baby, x-rays on net
~ay aid in increasing birthweight.

Treataents thus mattor for birth outco~e&,

and their effects depend on the pre-treatment choices of parents.
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Finally. If all relevant behavioral inputs are accounted for in our
onaly&e&. our eatiaate of the Black-White birthweight deficit~ of about 7
percent. fro• coluan 6 of Table 2, acy be interpreted e& biological in origin,
in accord with &oae of the

■ edical

literature suggesting that the saaller pelvic

stru~ture of Black woaen aay be conducive toward low-~eight Black babies at
birth <with gubsequent aore rapid post-natal growth aaong survivor& of low
weight infancy>.

The inherent frailty of Black infants that these result&

&uggest has iaportant iaplicationa for the interpretation of racial difference&
in the distribution of aedical treataents, discussed below.
c.

Reduced-Fora Esti•ates:

Pre-Treatment Inputs and Trect~ent Equations

Table 3 reports the estiaates of the reduced-for• equations relating the

exogeneous characteristics of the fflothers and their children to (i> pre
treatment health-related decisions of the parent& ~nd Cii) the probability of
receiving each _of the four medical treat•ents.
Table 3 recapitulates Table 1.

With respect to the latter •.

except that one can assess the effects of

socioeconoPic characteristics on the probabilities of receiving the treataents
in a aultivariate context, end measure the effect~ of the exogeueous endowaent
of the infant on both the mother's pre-treatment behavior and the treataents.
The NMFS provides three variables ch~racterizing the socioeconoaic status
of the faaily. the ~other's and father'& &choolins attainnent. and the husband'&
incoae.

To capture possible non-linearities at the lower tail of the incoae

distribution. evident in Table 1 for soae of the treat•ent variable&, we clso
constructed a categorical variable taking on the value of one if the husband'&
incoae was less than SG000.

To the extent that subsidized aedical care is

provided a& part of co~pensation for full-time workers, we would expect the
effects of husband's income <and husband's schooling> to reflect both inco~e and
health price <subsidy) effects, while the effect& of the schooling attainMent of
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Table 3 .

Effects of Exoger.ous Health Status arrci Parent,l Cnaracteristics on Characteristics
of Births and Probabilities of Receiving Specif1c ~1cal Treat111entsi
(1)

Selectec

Explanatory va~iables/
Estimation Procecure
Exooeoous healtn status
<;1e-31

Mother's scnoc:in;
Husband's SC~:);)ling
ttus~artd' s ircoo!?
he 1e-t1
ttusoart' s iriccee

J. $62~0
BlacK

(2)

Mother's NUli::>er
Age at
of
Birtn
Birt!'ls
OLS
OLS
-.371
-.0552
(8. 26) b (4.77;b
-.0877
.417
(27.2)
(21.8)

.123

-.0316

(8. 52)
151
139.Sl
•138

23, 1
(23.21
.0357

(1.36)

(1. 49)

.299

-.215
(2. 41)

(0.88}

(8.33)

(3)

(4)

Delay in Num::>er
Pr_enatal
of
Care
visits
OLS
DLS
, 195
<12.4)

-.i546

(5i

S,,;o-:1 n:

Oi..S

1.32
-. 29-1
(8.64) 0 (17,,4):l
-.555
.1t2
(6. 93)
(21.51
0857..,
-. 125
(7. 95}
(5.13)
-1!. i
6.95

(6)

Amniocer.tes1s
!tll.Prob1 t
-1.89
(42. l)C
-,00558

(7)

Ultra-

Caesareari

X-Ray

~!10?":

Mi..Probit

l>ILProbit

!L'-:..."'!"O:llt

-£.19
(4, 75)C
,00544
(1.21)

(2.45)

(l. ii':i

(5.85)

10.eu

-,Jel
(3.97i

•84-4
(4. 94i

-.25e

•0-'.:"o2
·10. 88)

-.559

(2.10)

(2.20)

-.145
<e.2€,i

.100
(1.54)
.0931
(2. 41)

.

(9)

..!Q!:[£_

(1~. 0)
-. 0384
(7. 47}
-10.9
(8.05)
• 171
(4. 75)

(0.62)
•00939
(1. 09)
12. 7

(8)

.0235

(5. 60)
-. 0131

-.es3e
(0.2'2)

-.354

-.142

(22, 7)C
.0~9

(9,5,2)C

.e21B

(5.64)
•t.153

(4.14)

(2. 97)

<e. 72)

-.~JSl

2.39

1.62

(1.82)

ii ;:,::;·,

(0.%)

i3.i2)

.-.e334 -.··--·le.5
-.234

.17&

(0.87)

tt.W

a. Ts:ile de.es mt reoor~ coefficients for cc,mr.::mity-le,el varia.:le~ li:;te-: in fi;:)&ridix Ta:ile A-1 sr,o includer: ir; t1e
speci ficat 1 or,s.
b. A~~lute values oft-ratios be~~ath coefficients in coilli;m,
c. Absolute values of asYJllptotic t-ratios tier,eath t'oefficients in columr..

r,

the aother, for given huaband'a incoMe, will aore nearly corre&pond to pure
inco•e effecta, oa leaa than one-half of aarried woaen below age 49 hold full
tiae Job&.

Schooling aay al&o reflect health <tiae> preference, ond/or

abilities to produce <pre-treataent) health <Gro&&Dan, 19721 fucha, 1982;
Haveaan and Wolfe, 1984).

If •other'& schooling i& a&&ocicted positively with

preference& for health, given price& and incoae, or schooling augaent& household
and aarket productivity equally, the difference between reduced-fora end
conditional •other'& schooling effect& on treataent& would be &iailar to that
a&&ociated with pure incoae effects.

If, a& noted above, those woaen with

higher lE1vel& -of schooling have higher opportunity cost& of th1e, and receiving
treatllents i& a tiae-intansive activity, then conditional will exceed reduced
fora schooling effect& even if pure incoae effect& are saall or non-existent •
. The.correspondence& between the reduced-for11 and conditional Con pre-treat.1tent
~ealth inputs> effects of husband's inco11e and schooliri9 in the treataent
equations aay thus differ.
The estiaated affect& of the healthiness(µ.) of the child. net of parental
l.

and aedical inputs, on both sets of inputs are significantly differe-nt from zero
at the 0.005 level, despite.the unavoidable errors in ~easuring the
birthwaight endow~ent; as discussed eorliar.

The estimates indicate th~t each

of the four •adical treat1tents i& les& likely to be provided to observ~tionally
identical aothers \Jith healthier (heavier> infants.

Pre-treataent health and

11edical treataent& are evidently substitute&; that is, treat11ents are allocated

disproportionally lo the proble11 pregnancies.
The relationstip& between the endogenous, pre-treataent characteristics of
the births and the 9ndowments also su99est coapensatory behavior by parents.

In

particular, •others with healthier infants delay seeking medical care and visit
the doctor less often.

Thus, healthier infants receive significantly less
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aedical care.

Roreover, mothers with healthier infant& (net of inputa>·are aore

likely to have the infant& later in life <which beyond age 26 reducea birth
vei9ht> and to &soke More cigarettes while pregnant (which reduce& birthweight
for any age at birth>.

Theae reaults thu& auggest that inequalitie a acroas

infants in endowed health, aa aeasured by birthwaight net of parental Gnd
aedical inputs, are greater than inequalitie s in actual birth outcoaea as a

result of both the co11penaatory pre-treatMe nt resource allocative decisions of
parents and the allocation of Redical treataent.s.
The pre-treat•~ nt endogenous birth characteris tic& and the probabiliti es of
receiving sedical treatnent& are also significant ly correlated with the
&ocioecono aic chf'racteris t.ics of parents.

The results in Table 2 suggested that

parental decisions concerning the tiMing, spacin~, and nu11ber of births, and
~•okin9 during .the pregnancy Qffect birthweight net of treatments while the
treatment& affect birthweight differentia lly according to the endogenous
c~aracteris tics of the birth. The reduced-for a results in Table 3 indicate that
parents' socioeconol iic cbaracteri& tics.; significant ly influence pre-treat11e nt
. decisions; thus, it is not surprising that net of endow11ents, the aedical
trectaent& are also co~related with the characteris tics of the parents.

The

existence of the reduced-for • association s between parental socioecono aic
characteris tic~ ~nd the likelihood of prenatal treat11ents cannot therefore
inforat us on whether infants of &i1tilar pre-treall\e nt health--gro ss of parental
inputs--ara equally likely to receive medical tre~tments regardless of parental
resources.

This is because parents with different schooling levels end inco~e

evidently bring to the Medical syste• for treat•ent infant& with different
charecteris tics,
The reduced-for • estiMates reported in Tablo 3 indicate that husband'&
inco~e end •other'& schooling have qualitative ly similar effects.
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For exaaple,

infent& born to lower-<husband'a) incoae parents are born earlier in the
aother'a lifo-cycle, and. partioularly in low-inco•• household•• are of lover
parity, receive aedical care le&& frequently and later after conception, and are
aore exposed to aatornal aaoking.

The aothera of auch infanta are also

significantly le&& likely to receive aaniocente&ia and x-ray& while pregnant,
and are le&a likely to receive a caesarean section at the birth of the child
(particularly, in the latter case, for ~others with husbands earning lec.s than
$6000 per year>.

Infant& born to leas-educated •others, given their father's

schooling and incoae, tend to be born earlier in the mother's life-cycle, and to
be of higher parity.

Such 11others also &eek prenatal care le&& frequently and

less-rapidly, saoke aore while pregnant and are le&s likely to receive x-rays
and e cses8rean sectJ.on.
For given parental socioeconomic characteristics. Black infants also have
different (endo9enou$) cliaracteristic& co11pared to White infants-- they tend to
be of lower parity and to receive prenatal aedical care &i9nificantly ln&
rapidly and less frequently.

Black 11other& are no less likely, however, given

_their incone and education. to receive ultra-sound, x-rays or a caesarean
section than are White mothers, but are significantly less likely to receive
oaniocentasis.

The gross differentials by race in the incidence of 11edical

&ervices among pregn~nt women evident in Table 1 ~an thus al•ost wholly be
accounted for by racial differences in parents' education and incoae. However,
Black infant& differ in endogenous c~aracteristics fro• infants born to White
aothers, as is evident in columns 1 through 5 in Table 3.

Horeovor, Black

infants, for given pre-treataent inputs, are &~~ller than White infant& <Table
2>.

Thus, the absence of &i9ni:ficant treatl'llent differentials in the reduced

fora equations does not i11ply that there are no racial differentials in the
incidence of medical treat11ent among in!~nt& ££•parable in health-related
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chorocteriatica .

To aaaeaa thi• diatributional iaaue, o• noted at the outset,

requires that the deterainant& of treataent& be assessed "controlling for" pre
treataent conditiona,whic h we exaldne below.
d.

Conditional Treat~ent Eguctipn&

Table 4 report& two-stage, aaxiaua-likelih ood probit eatiaotes of the
effects of the endogenous, pre-treataent birth characte1·istic& of the infant and
of parents' Gocioeconoaic characteristic$ on the likelihood of receiving each of
the four aedical treatment&.

Table 5 reports the test statistic& associated

with assessing the null hypotheses for each treatment that (i) the pre-treataent
birth characteristics are uncorrelated with the treatment equation residuals
.(which include the un111easured health status of the infant> and <ii> the set of
parental socioeconc~ic characteristic s <income end schooling>, net of the birth
~haracteristics influencing child ~ealth and the efficacy of the treat11ents. ase
not significantly'as &ociated with the probability of receiving the treat11ent.4
for ell but aaniocentesis, these hypotheses are ~eJected at ct least the .01
level; both hypotheses are re3ected ct the .10 level for amniocentesis.

Thus.·

the re~ults reported in Table 4 suggest that net of the i11portant health-relat0d
characteristic& of infants determined in part by parents. parental inco~e and
schooling play an additional role in who gets treat~ents.5

The regi•e of equal

treatnents for e~ucl conditions does not appear to characterize the allocation
of Medical care, circa 1980 in the United Statesg with respect to pregnant
w011en.

The estinata5 in Table 4 also indicate that the incidence of prenatal
treatMents differi by the characteristics of the child that are influenced by
parents' decisions.

For exa11ple. infants with mothers who del(ly seeing a doct()r

and who s11oke are less likely to receive any of the four treatMents, while
Mothers of closely-spaced infants are 11ore likely to receive x-rays ~nd a
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Ta:,le 4
Effects of Birth Characteristics ar~ Parental Characteristics on
.-ectica! Treatments: Two-Stage I"'... Probit Estimates

Selected ex::a•,atory

Amniocentesis

va:-1ables

(1)

Birt!'l Cr,ara::-te-s:hr::s
· Exoge!"!Ous r,:alth status (xai-2)

-.114

Age of mo!r;f':"' at b1rtha
Age of rot;e- squaredacxie-2>
~u•ber of :1rttJcl
First i;:;,r~

Previous b:r.~ interval(il)
!".ot"ler s11,:>-:~a

Delay in !J"'~,atal visita
Plural oi'rte:

Cl

-.295

-.119
(5.52i
-.e56

(1.~)

(0.58)

.553

.498

(1.00)
.380
(2.05)

(0.59)
.623
(2.51}

(11. 6)b

Ul trasoun.'.l

(2)

.0!54
(3.34)

-.159
(1. 17)
.239

-. 0334
(5.9S)

(5. 97)

-.04~

.0144

-.228

-.578

(1.39)

(2.~)

-.050

.398

1.e3
(2.22)
.181
(1. 3£.i
-.6~3

29?
(0. 04)
.eS&5
(0. 61)

60~

-. 0l-B3
(4. ~)

-.085
(3.57)

• 009!1

u.eJ>
3.41
(0. 81)
-.i424
<e. 84>

(1,88)

-.0282
(1.19)

~.897

-.247

(2.23)

(2.03)

Caesa~ea~ fu?ctior,
(l)

(2i

-.eJa3
(7.08)
-.60S
(3. 781
1.H
(J.89i
• 157
(1.55)

-.W.5
15.Sai

.t~
(0,
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-. i.22s . -.0!7a
(3.23)
14,es:
-.tjo57 -.t.21:
(2.2f)
(0.34)
-.354
-.243
(4,69i
(4. 62)
.620
•59'.
(7.43)
(9. 0: >
•045€,

.'t458

-

(1.44)

(2.13)

(6. 44}
•t-525
(J. 02)
.0771

.-

(x10'."£J

-.0595

(0.21)

.0455
(2. 61 J

(0. 91)

B:ack !111ot:ie-l

.034~
(4.13)

-.294

-.0rnti

l'!us:>arid' s s::--.:,olin~

i

(2)

(0,34)

(0.48)

Husband's irc.:rme

(1)

(0.16)
(1.~)
. -.01?-Bt -. ~367
(3.46)
(0.07)
(0,36)
.215
1,25
.441
1.05
-.543
(0. 32)
(1.58)
(l,45)
(2. 91)
(l, lj£)
-.00$86 -.00482 .0207
•0407 -.e~m
(0.90)
(5.88)
(6.%)
<e.38>
(1.82)
-.04Yr -.es% -.0!98 -.0253 -.9338
(2. 66)
(1. 67)
(2.48)
(1,60i
(3.52)
-.1n -.184 -.133 -.t4eS -. 268
(1.82)
(1.37)
(2.%}
(~. 67}
(4. 94)
.e01
.242
.620
.507
.618
(1, 70)
(1. 62)
(9.83)
(6.69)
(9. 35)

C.."la"'ac:te:-ist1~ c,f oa,..·erts
~other 1 s s:;:d in;

r'.',JSl;a'r.:i I S i!'.:-Olll:?

X-Rav

(2)

-.04&5

ce.ssi

-1.82
(7. 23)
.339
(7.35)
• 12p
(7.35)

-.363
~0.84)

-.e~
(3.~,2)

-.00234
(0.12i

-.222
(3.05)
.617
(7.49)
.0765
(3. 7~)

.0135
(1. 57)

2. 72
(0. 67}

-.2.%
(5. 93)
.137
.471
(2.Nl
(1, 9l}

a. Erllio;eno~s varia~le.
:i. P.symo,ot:: .-raiios in oarentneses oer,eatn coeffic:ients.
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Table 5

Test Statistics, Treatment Equationsa

Trectment

Test
Endogeneity.0£
Influence 0£
Birth Charccteristics Parental Characteristics

Amniocentesis

12.3

32.0

Ultrasound

50.6

230.2

X-Ray

36.3

171.0

Caesarean Section

72.9

140.0

x2 Critical value, .05

12.6

35.2

x2 Critical value, .01

16.8

41~6

8.

Likelihood ratio tests.

caesarean &ection but are le&& likely to receive ultra&ound.6

Consistent with

the estiaotea in Table 2 indicating that o•niocente&ia and x-rays ai9nificantly
augMent the birthweight of babies born in a plural birth, both procedures Cos
well o& ultrasound ond caesarean section> are significantly ~ore likely to be
applied when there i& a plural birth.

Despite, however, the finding reported in

Table 2 that x-ray& lower birthwei9ht for higher-parity births born to older

Mothers, such treataents appear to be provided More frequently to such births.
But, of course, x-ray& and the other procedures ~ay aid in aMeliorating other
conditions associated with aaternal age ond parity than weight at birth.
Which of the two alternative aarket regines characterizing the allocation
.of Medical treatfflents doainates--the regressive tax-subsidy regiae CII> or the
Market regiae? Infant health and the set of prenatal treat11ents appear to be

substitutes, as indicated by the reduced-for~ endowment effects on the
probabilities of tre.:itllents in Table 3.

The income eff.ects on treat:aents ~hould

therefore be algebraically higher when esti11ated conditional on endogenous
infant health attributes compared to the estiaated inco•e effects froa the
· reduced for11s. wh€m thG 11arket regiae is characterized by income-independent
prices. If i~plicit prices fall sufficiently with income, however, the
conditional "income affects"' will be smaller than the unconditional incoae
e:£:£ects.

In the case of the three treat~ents for which we can reJect with confiden~e
the hypothesis that .their provision depends solely on the health-related
conditions of the pregnancy. the change in the coefficient associated·with th~
•other's schooling across the conditional and unconditional reduced-for•
equations yields an una~biguous result.

The conditional schooling coefficient

is positive, statistically significant, and higher than its reduced-for•
counterpart by nearly a factor of 10 for ultrasound. by 50 percent for x-rays,
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and by 300 percent for ccoaarean &ectiona.

Hothera of &iailor pre-treat•ent

health atotus, but vith greater resource& and/or de~and for health, are not only
aore likely to receive the three aedicol treataenta, but health-conditioned
education difference& in treataent incidence exceed those difference&
unconditioned on health status.

Thi& pattern is in accord with health being a

noraal good·in a noraal aarket for health treataents; thus, we can find no
ovidence for the proposition that the iaplicit price of treataents fall&
strongly with incoae.7
The result& for the husband'& incoae variablas are &oaewhat less clear,
because of the lack of precision of aost of the incoae coefficient& in Tables 3
and 4.

However. the conditional linear income coefficients ore greater than

their reduced-fora counterparts for all three tre~tments for which the set of
&ocioeconoaic variables are statistically significant <Table 5).

Moreover. the

&tatistically significant negative non-linear incoae tar• for caesareans <Tabl~
3) rises algebraically by 200 percent in the conditional equation and retain&
it& statistical significance.

There is thus li~tle evidence of a negative

association between the i•plicit-treatMent price and inco~e.

~o&t certainly,

Moreover, caesarean ~~ctions are significantly aore likely to be provided to
~ore educated and higher inco~e families even a•ong wo~en with the sa•e health·

status.
Table 4 also indicates that there exist significant racial differences in
the likelihood of receiving aedical treatments aaon9 wo~en with app~rently
identical pre-treat•ent health conditions--Black "others otherwise identical
with respect to both pre-treataent birth charact~ristics and schooling and
inco~e are significantly less likely to receive amniocentesis and x-rays and are
Marginally aore likely to receive a caesarean section compared to White
P.others.8

The l~tter differential is consistent with the evidence concerning
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racial differences in pelvic structure; however, the lower likelihood of
receiving a•niocentesis and x-ray& aaong Blacks i& surprising given the evidence
in Table 2 that even for given parental inputs Black babies are frailer than
White babies.

It is notable that differences in pre-treat~ent behaviors across

race groups, not accounted for in the reduced-foras or in the gross racial
differentials displayed in Table 1, aask significant racial disparities in
treataent incidence.

These differentials by race were not apparent in either

the gross treatsent rates by race <Table 1> or in the reduced-fora equations
accounting for the incidence of treat1tents by race controlling only for
socioeconoaic status. - Controlling for (endogenous> initial health status c:;an be
i11portant for understanding how the health care systea allocates aedical
treataents acro&s sc;cioecono:aic groups.
3.

Conclusion
In this paper we have exaained how aedical traataents are distributed aaon9

pregnant women according to both their initial health ~nd their econoaic
resources under different iaplicit pricing regiaes- for allocating aedicol
&ervicea.

We showed that when the following three conditions hold--(i> aedical

treataents and pre-trectaent health status are subatitutes in the sense that
treat11ents ere aaeHorati-ve; <ii> pre-treatment health is influenced by agents'
behavior: and (iii> trectMents are allocated in a •arket with unifora prices-
then differences in health status prior to treatment will not only not account
for disparities in treatment by inco:ae end education, but such disparities will
be greeter within groups of identical pre-treatment health status then across
such groups in the entire population.
Based on a probability sc11ple of :acrried pregnant women havin9 c legitbate
live birth in 1980 in the United States, we found that (i) more-educated woaen
and woJaen with husbunds

havlng higher incoaes receive a disproportionate share
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of the four aaJor treataents studied. Cii) the prenatal treat~enta are aore
likely to be provided to leas-healthy infant& CJRother•> within achooling and
inco•e groups, and (iii) treataent differential& by education and incoae are
increased by controlling for tho&e behav.iora that affect the pre-treataent
healthiness of the infanta

The result& thu& are consistent with the existence

of a ~arket regiae for aedical care that allocate& health treatMent& to tho&e
who demand thea. whether the deaand i& due to superior knowledge of the benefits
of health, greater resources, or preferences.

We thus could not find evidence

that the tax subsidization of health care dominantly influences the allocation•
· of these foras of 11\edica-l care, nor evidence that health-related subsidies

targated to the poor hGva aliBinated income disparities in treat•ents.
It is also shown that the healthiness of the aother and child. net of the
·. influences of both p1·enatal input& and treat11ent&., may Jointly affect pre
treataent parental decigion& and the use of subsequent treataents.

We found

that, as expected., xother& of healthier infant& were more likely to postpone
seeing a doctor. visited the doctor less often, and were le&& likely to receive
treat•e~ts while pregnant.

This coMpensatory allocation of ~edical services,

co11bined with the inability to measure directly all contributions to pre
treatHent health that are observed by the decision-~aking agents <parents and
doctors>. can lead to erroneous inferences concerning the efficacy of the
treat~ents.

This selection bias in the use of Medical care make& it appear. for

e~aMple. that one pranatal procedure, amniocentesis, reduces birthweight while
its use appears to actually increase birthweight when selection i& taken into
account.

Controlling for initial health status can therefore significantly

change 11easures of the therapeutic benefits of •edically-adPinistered treat11ent&
in the U.S. health care systea.
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Finally, Black aothera were found to hcve lower birthweight infants.than do
White& net of treataent& and their own pre-treataent health behavior.

Despite

this, they are aore likely to postpone visiting a doctor, and see a doctor le&&
frequently._

And even wh~n pre~treataent behavior, schooling, and inco•e are

taken into occount, Black •other& are no aore likely than White Mothers to

receive x-ray& end are significantly le&& likely to receive either amniocentesis
or ultrasound.

Black aothers are Marginally Bore likely, howe~er, to receive a

caesarian section with it& associated higher Mortality rate&.

The allocation

regi~e behind the distribution of ffiedical treataent& to pregnant women in the
United States, which appear& to be consistent in several regards with a
conventional narket r.egiae, i& also •arked by an unexplained tendency to serve
the Black population le&& extensively than i t does the White.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

There have been a nu•bsr of prior iaportant econoaic and epideaiol09ical
studies of the de~and for aedical care <e.g., Acton, 1975: Colle and
Grossaan, 1978: Goldman and Gross•an, 1978: Ad~y, et al., 1982).

These

studies, however, a) are of populations heterogen·eous in health conditions,
b> exaaine only visits to Medical personnel, not the distribution of
services delivered by such personnel, and c> ..control"' for initial health
conditions by eaploying subJective indicators of healthiness <excellent,
good, fair, etc.> ascertained subsequent to the use of the Medical
services.

As nhown in Hanning et al. <1982), the use of these post

treat•ent, subJective health •eaaures to take account of initial health
· status leads to significant biases in the esti•ates of inco~e and/or
&chooling effect& on 111edical care use.

Eaplc,yaent of obJective indicators

of health, even aeasured prior to treataent, as controls, however, would
&till lead to inconsistent estbates, as we discuss below, since health and.
u&o of aedical inputs may reflect the same underlying preferences or
· biological propensities for healthiness.
2.

There is thus scope for the doctor to ..creatu" deMand by overstating the
efficacy of treatfflents.

Competition a~ong doctors presu~ably reduces this

asymmetric infor~ation problem, but we focus on distributional rather than
efficiency issues here.
3.

Inferences about the effects of health care pricing regimes based on the
differential behavior of agents participating in different private health
care plans

are made difficult because agents' preferences for health and

innate healthiness clearly influence the choice of Medical care insurance
(adverse selection).

Identification restrictions needed to ascertain the

effects of the health plans are unclear.

The RAND health insurance study
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<Hanning et al.,1982> based on the randoaization of insurance scheaes
provides soae iaportant insight& with respect to price-induced health
behavior for the experiaental groups studied, but cannot provide
inforaation about the actual distribution of aedical care across
homogeneous groups in the United States associated with the current aedical
care pricing£!:!!.. tax syste11.
4.

The two-€tage probit esti•ation procedure and tests for endogeneity are
discussed in Newey (1985) and Saith and Blundell (1986).

5.

Note th~t we cannot use our esti•ates from Table 4 to coapute the
distribution of treatMents under a regiMe in which only the efficacy of the
treat~ents <pre-treatment health) aatters, ~sin a compulsory health
· insurance regi~e, based on the pre-treat11ent- variable coefficients.

This

is because a change in the pricin9 of Medical services would induce a
corresponding change in the distribution of pre-treatment health-related
consu11ption goods (11oral hazard).
6.

While the ti11ing of.the first visit (delay) to a doctor or clinic by the
Mother is a decision 11ade_principal ly by the 11other and represents c pre
treati,.ent ••condition"' which the doctor 111ay need to taka into account, the
nu~ber of prenatal visits reflects the treati,.ents provided and is thus
influenced aG ~ell by the doctor.

The numbsr of visits by the mother to

the doctor is ~ot the~efore e111ployed as a •0asure of pre-treat~ent health
status in esti.·•1atin9 the deter11immts of tn'.at11ent incidence net of pre
treataent heal~h conditions.
7.

If education and income were 11erely proxies for pre-treat•ent health

conditions not reflected in the other behavioral variables, they would be
negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a treat111ent, if
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health i& a nor~al good.

Thi& i& because. a& &een in Table 3. treat~ent&

are aore likely to be provided to le&&-healthy infant&/aother&.
8.

It is notable that in 1978 the •aternal aortality rate for cae&arean
daliverie& was four ti~es that of vc9inal deliveries <National Institute of
Child Health and Developnent. 1982>.
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Appendix Table A
Instrumental Variables, Data Sources and Sample Statistics

Variable Def.illition

Data Source

Sample Mean•

(Standard
Deviation)
lloclical Services: Available: Collllty
Physicians per capita 1980 (x103)

Co-stat-1

OB/GYN p~r capita 1975 (xl03)

AGI

General Practitioner per capita 1975
(x103)
Hosp.ital family planning clinics per capita
1980 cx1os>
Uealth Dept. family planning clinics
per capita 1980 (x105)
Planned Parenthood clinics per capita
1980 (x.105)
Other family plauning clinics per capita

AGI

1.14
(1.44)
.275

(.155)
AGI

AGI
AGI

.874
(.316)
.713

(.181)
.603
( .905)
.14S
(.313)

AGI

.0903
(".366)

Government Programs: County
Expenditures per capita on Hospitals 1980

Co-stat-1

.334

Expenditures per capita on Education 1980

Co-stat-1

.0519

Hospital beds per capita 1980

Co-stat-1

(.0557)
.00831
(. 0163}

(xlOS)

( .122)

AFDC maximum monthly benefits for family
of four Ct)
Food stamps bonn£ potential if only income
is AFDC per family of four (t)

Labor market: County
Employment share in Agriculture

. Urban

Urban

298.
(111.)
84.3
(31. 7)

Co-stat-1

.0474
( .0552)

Employment share in -Construction

Co-stat-1

.0606
(. 0202}

Employment share in Manu·factur ing

Co-stat-1

.222

Employment share in Transportation

Co-stat-1

( .0903)
.0724

Employment share in Wholesale/Retail Trade

Co-stat-1

Employment share in Financial Services

Co-stat-1

(.0177)
.205
(.0235)
.0582

Employment share in Educational Services

Co-stat-1

(. 0217)
.0861
( .0245)

.

.'

Bmploymen~ share in Business Services

Co-stat-1

Employment share in Entertainment

Co-1t1t-l

Employment share in Health Services

Co-atat-1

Employment share in Public Administration

Co-stat-1

Urban share of Population

Co-stat-1

Unemployment Rate for Females in 1980

('Ai)

Unemployment Rate for Males in 1980 (~)
Prices. Taxes. Regulations:
Alcohol state monopoly

Co-stat-1
Co-st~t-1

.0402
(. 0142)
.0415
(.0195)
.0734
(.0170)

.os:u

( .0318)
• 725
( .262)
6.63
(2.28)
6.61
(2.60)

State
Facts

.309
(.462)

Facts

.ss2

Cigarette price/pk. 1974 (t)

Tobacco

(.S79l
45.S

Ce)

Tobacco

Tax on gallon of wine($)

Cigarette price/pk. 1979

Cigarette sales tax/carton 1974

Ct)

·Tobacco

Cigarette sales tax/carton 1979

Ce)

Tobacco

(4.92)
60.4
(4.81)
9.48.
(7.96)
13.6
(10. 7)

Beer average Jan. and July price 1976 (6 pk)

Ornstein

Beer average Jan. and July pric~ 1979 (6 pk)

01nstein

Liquor 8 brand average price 1976 (fifth)

Ornstein

Liquor 8 brand average price 1979 (fifth)

Ornstein

Ethnic and Racial Origin:
Mother race Asian

1.80
(1.89)
2.06
( .221)
6.59
(.532)
6.96
(.588)

Individual
NNS/MQ

.0268
( .161)

Mother race Black

NNS/MQ

.0781

Mother origin Iri~h

NNS/MQ

(.268)
.308

Mother origin Puerto Rican

NNS/MQ

Mother origin Cuban

NNS/MQ

Mother origin Mex~can

NNS/MQ

( .461)
.00941
(. 0966)
.00182
(. 0426)

.0453
(.208)

Father race Asian

NNS/MQ

.0258
(.159)

Father origin Irish

J.

NNS/MQ

.233
( .423)
.00903
(. 0945)
.00194
( .0440)
.0418

Father origin Puerto Rican

NNS/MQ

Father origin Cuban

NNS/MQ

Father origin Mexica n

NNS/MQ

Child race Black

NNS/BC

Mother origin all Hispan ic countr ies
(includ ing other Spanis h)

NNS/.MQ

.0818
(.274)
.0713
( .257)

NNS/MQ

12.7

Father 's educati on (years)

NNS/MQ

13.0

Father 's in~ome (l/year )

NNS/MQ

Father 's height (inches )

NNS/MQ

(2.53)
15.814 .
(8817. )

Father 's weight (pound s)

NNS/MQ

Person al Chara cterist ics: Individ ual
Mother 's educati on (years)

( .200)

(2.31)

69.9
(6-. 31)
174c
(28.8)

•sampl e weighte d. with.b irths of less than 2500 granis given one fourth
the weight ,
since they were selecte d four times as freque ntly as births greate r
or equal to 2500
grams.
Data sources codes:
Co-sta t-1:
U.S. Bureau of the Census , Washin gton, D.C •• County Statis tics
file. 1984.

AGI:
Tobacc o:

Alan Guttma cher Institu te IT0519 , 1-2 July 1985.
Corr:sp on~enc e Stanley Henshaw.

Person al

The Tax Burden on Tobacc o. The Tobacc o Ins ti tu,te, Washin gton,
1983.

D.c••
Ornste in:

Stanley · I. Ornste in, UCLA. Person al corresp ondenc e, June
1985, and Profes sor Michae l Grossm an, NBER/CUNY Gradua te
Center .

Facts:

1980 Facts and Figure s, The Tax Founda tion, 1980.

Urban:

Toby Campbe ll and Marc Bendec k, A Public Assist ance Data ~ook.
Urban Institu te, Washin gton, D.C., Octobe r 1977. yExhib i t 31A,
p. lj5.

NNS:

Nati~n al Natali ty Survey 1980; MQ--M other's Questi onnair e;
BC--Di rth ~ertif icate; Il--Hos pital Questi onnair e.
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